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1. INTRODUCTION
The transport infrastructure of the countries of Cen-
tral Europe has been adapted until the end of the 1980s
to the economic, social and geopolitical conditions hav-
ing existed in the Comecon (CMEA) area. Irrespective
of the differences in the development levels and the dif-
ferences in standards (both with respect to the countries
of Western Europe, and among the particular countries
of the region), this infrastructure largely satisfied the
needs arising in that period. After the fall of the iron cur-
tain in 1989 the same infrastructure started to function in
entirely new external and internal conditions. It could not
stand up to the challenge of these new conditions in many
situations, and so its development and modernisation be-
came the priority, upon whose fulfilment the ultimate suc-
cess of the transformation processes depended. In this
context, new and specific barriers were uncovered of an
institutional character. The present short report starts with
the outline of the new conditions mentioned and the in-
stitutional barriers associated with them. Then, five such
barriers are characterised in the example of Poland.
     Thus, the new internal conditions for the functioning of
the transport infrastructure have been formed mainly by:
• The distinct acceleration of the rate of change in the
structure of transport activities, both in cargo and pas-
senger transport, consisting in a loss of significance of
railways and inland navigation transport, with a simul-
taneous dynamic increase of importance of car trans-
port, and, though to a lesser degree, of the pipeline and
air transport (see Table 1).
• The decentralisation and privatisation of the economy,
including trade (increase of demand for short-distance
cargo transport) and the transport (first of all road trans-
port).
• The decrease of the role of heavy industry, and thus a
drop in demand for mass cargo transport.
• Significant limitation to job commuting, especially to
regional and local centres.
• Very rapid increase of the number of passenger cars.
Out of the total number of 8.1 million new passenger
cars that appeared during the period 1990-1999 in Cen-
tral Europe, as many as 4 million appeared on Polish
roads, followed by 1.7 million in Romania.
• Financial difficulties (and the associated decrease of the
range and quality of service) of the large state-owned
carriers, and not always successful attempt of structural
transformations in these enterprises.
     On the other hand, the primary external factors were:
• Opening up of the borders and the abrupt increase of
the border traffic of persons and vehicles. In the pe-
riod 1990-1997 the cross-border traffic (in both direc-
tions) increased from 84.2 million to 273.9 million
persons2. This dynamic stagnated only a bit later, and
REPORT
Table 1 Polish transport modal split 1990-2003
Modal split Freight Passenger
transport transport
tkm pkm
1990 2003 1990 2003
Rail transport 24.1 19.6 49.6 34.7
Road transport* 11.6 30.9 45.9 52.9
Air transport 0.0 0.0 4.4 12.1
Pipeline transport 4.1 9.4 xxx xxx
Inland water transport 0.3 0.4 0.0 0.1
Sea transport 59.9 39.7 0.2 0.2
*urban transport excluded
Source: Transport - wyniki dzialalnosci (Transport – the results of activity)1
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in the years 2000-2003 a decrease was observed. Af-
ter accession of Poland to the European Union, in the
summer months of 2004, the traffic intensified again,
especially across the Polish-German border. At the
same time the cargo traffic has been increasing inces-
santly since 1989. The number of trucks having crossed
all the Polish borders in 1980 in both directions was
295,000, by 1990 this number increased to 1.1 million,
and by 2003 - to close to 6.2 million.
• The shift of the main directions of foreign trade and
transit; in the majority of the countries of the region
in question here the Soviet Union, having occupied the
first place as the trade partner, was replaced by the now
unified Germany; the subsequent ranks started also to
be occupied by other countries of the European Union.
In the trade over the eastern direction, first of all raw
materials preserved their high position (meaning, there-
fore, the pipeline and railway transport). After the year
2000, the route Moscow-Warsaw-Berlin lost its posi-
tion of the most important transit direction in Poland
for car transport. Greater transit traffic through Poland
is nowadays observed between the Baltic states
(Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, as well as Finland) and
Western Europe (the “Via Baltica” route). The role of
transit from Ukraine increased slightly, as well. The
lorries from the countries of the former USSR did, as
a rule, not observe the load limits and, along with some
of the domestic carriers, contributed to the devastation
of Polish roads.
• The appearance of competition for the sea and air ports
from the side of the similar facilities located in Western
Europe; in the first case this applies mainly to Ham-
burg, Rotterdam and Trieste with respect to servicing
of Czechia, Slovakia and Hungary, previously done by
the Baltic Sea ports of Gdansk or Szczecin, and in the
second case - to the airports in Berlin (for the passen-
gers from western Poland) and in Vienna (for the pas-
sengers from Slovakia and western Hungary); the
evidence is provided by the share of 14% taken by the
border crossing on the route Warsaw-Berlin in the to-
tal value of Polish imports from the United States.
• Taking up of the membership negotiations with the
European Union and the inclusion in the system of
European transport corridors (TINA); adoption of the
corridor system as the one in force in a way predefines
the future investment priorities (possibilities of co-
financing from the European funds).
As mentioned before, the existing transport infra-
structure was as a rule not capable of matching these new
conditions. The broadly conceived institutional infrastruc-
ture, directly and indirectly influencing transport, has not
been adapted to the new conditions, either. The state of
infrastructure lagged behind the quickly developing
economy – in the years 1994-1999 – and the changes in
the lifestyles of a large part of the population. The trans-
port system turned out to be little elastic3 when confronted
with the transformation-induced changes. Due to the lack
of adaptation to the new socio-economic and political
situation, the transport infrastructure became a brake for
economic growth. In accordance with the results of stud-
ies conducted at the University of Wrocaw, among the
foreign investors, who located their capital in Poland, as
much as 68% of the companies accounted for in the study,
mentioned the access to modern road infrastructure as the
key location factor4.
     Among the specific institutional barriers, which were
uncovered in the course of development of transport in
the period of transformation, we should mention here:
(a) Lack of consistency in the transport policy of the
State, involving lack of concentration of means on the
explicitly adopted transport policy (commented upon
further on),
(b) Inertia of the spatial development plans in the domain
of infrastructural development (commented upon fur-
ther on),
(c) Inertia in functioning of the large state-owned car-
rier companies - lack of subsidies, coupled with si-
multaneous lack of essential restructuring changes or
with errors committed when undertaking such
changes,
(d) The excess liberalisation of the procedures in the do-
main of protesting against and blocking the invest-
ment projects by the local social groups,
(e) Little flexible policy in the domain of improvement
of road safety.
The majority of the barriers mentioned negatively af-
fect the drive towards the broadly understood sustainability
of transport development. The lack of implementation deci-
sions in the domain of transport projects (including road
construction projects), caused by the situation arising from
the presence of barriers, given the simultaneous enormous
(and not limited in any institutional manner) growth of the
number of passenger cars, and given the lack of a resolute
support for public transport, meant actually a practice that
is contrary to the idea of sustainability. Even the impact
of the apparently "pro-ecological” legal actions under-
taken by groups protesting against individual investment
INSTITUTIONAL ISSUES IN THE SUSTAINABILITY OF CROSS-BORDER TRANSPORT
52 • IATSS RESEARCH Vol.29 No.2, 2005
projects cannot be seen in this context as unequivocally
positive. Such protests are namely most often quite lo-
cal, and their objective is to push the nuisance associated
with transport away to neighbouring areas.
2. LACK OF STRATEGIC CONCEPT
A lot of successive documents and Governmental
strategies concerning transport policies have been elabo-
rated in the majority of countries of Central Europe,
including Poland. They outlined the plans for the develop-
ment of transport in the period until the year 2010 or even
20205,6. Most of them though, were commonly criticised
by the scholarly community7, in particular - for the lack
of internal consistency and the postulative character. The
designs fell short of indicating concrete sources for fi-
nancing of the postulated investment projects. Likewise,
the unequivocal indication of investment priorities was
lacking, an element necessary in conditions of constant
financial problems. At the same time, during the 1990s,
the State derived undoubtedly an important revenue ac-
cruing from the development of car transport (in various
direct forms, like through customs tariffs, high excise tax
on fuel, road tax, registration fees, driving license fees,
etc., and the indirect ones, e.g. through taxation on firms
producing cars and car accessories). According to the es-
timates elaborated for the area of the European Union in
the middle of the 1990s8, the total revenues from road
tolls and taxes paid by the road users were more than
twice as high as the sums disbursed on construction and
maintenance of roads. Such analyses have not been car-
ried out in Poland, but given the low outlays into the de-
velopment of road infrastructure, the analogous ratio is
certainly even more disadvantageous. Yet, during the
same period the countries of the Union spent significant
means on the more ecological forms of transport (first of
all development of railroad transport and inland naviga-
tion), while the outlays on such purposes were in Poland
severely limited.
There are no regulations that would force nowadays
the state budget to devote any (even the smallest) part of
the revenues on the development and modernisation of
transport infrastructure. In the middle of the 1990s the
road tax was included in the fuel price. A part of it ends
up in the communes in the form of a road subsidy, to be
then most often spent on local administration, or, alter-
natively, on education or health care. The numerous hikes
of the excise tax were mainly meant to increase the state
revenue. On the other hand, the sole true justification for
the hikes would be the obligatory use of the revenue thus
obtained for the transport-oriented investments.
     In other words, the limited volume of financial means
ought to lead to a univocal definition of a direction in the
state transport policy. This can be one of two directions:
• The European variant, with the clearly defined prefer-
ence for "environmentally friendly” transport forms (in-
vestment into the development of railways and public
transport in towns), higher degree of regulation and
high taxation on fuels;
• The American variant, with the preserved position of
the passenger car as the basis for satisfaction of trans-
port needs by households (investment first of all into
the road infrastructure), lower degree of regulation and
lower taxation on fuel (partly after Rietveld P., Stough
R.9).
The lack of univocal adoption of definite concepts
results partly from the enormous social expenditure bur-
den on the state budget, which, on the one hand, does
not allow for the giving up of significant revenues that
the development of car transport brought, and on the other
- leaves no room for an effective investment policy.
It is also disadvantageous that the decision process
concerning particular undertakings related to transport
infrastructure is situated at the parliamentary level. When
enacting the budget, MPs vote on the transfer of means
from one concrete project to another (see, e.g. the issue
of the subsidies for the construction of a subway in War-
saw, showing up at the occasion of every budgetary de-
bate). Striving to achieve the budgetary consensus is
therefore conducive to the further partitioning of the
means, which are anyway limited at the very start.
The situation having emerged assumes a special sig-
nificance in view of the possibility that Poland would take
advantage of the structural funds of the European Union.
The threat appears, namely, that these means will be used
to realise individual fragments of various kinds of net-
works, which would not at all be equivalent to the sus-
tainable development of the infrastructure system as a
whole.
In the conditions of lack of internal strategic con-
cepts the development of infrastructure may become to
an excessive degree the object of uniquely pan-European
policy. Yet, the unified treatment of the entire territory
of the European Union (EU-27) is, in the context of the
premises for the transport policy, potentially disadvanta-
geous for Poland and for other new members of the
Union. Numerous documents and reports10 show a dis-
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tinct shift in the weight of the recommendations submit-
ted from the planning of new investment projects in in-
frastructure towards the activities aimed at a better use
of the already existing infrastructure. This amounts, over
a longer-term perspective, to a threat for the support from
the European Union for the realisation of the main and
necessary investment projects in the region. The postu-
late of a better use of the existing infrastructure is, natu-
rally, well justified, but it cannot become the substitute
for the evening out of the disproportion existing in the
density of the modern transport networks between old and
new EU members.
3. INERTIA OF SPATIAL PLANNING
Since the beginning of the period of socio-economic
transformations the necessity was being emphasised in
Poland of the rapid improvement of the road infrastruc-
ture, including, first of all, construction of motorways and
expressways. No effort was made, however, when elabo-
rating the motorway construction program, of changing
the former concepts of the fundamental pattern of the
main international and domestic infrastructural connec-
tions (see Figure 1). The program mentioned was, in fact,
a repetition of the plans prepared in the 1960s and 1970s,
which stemmed from the conviction of the key signifi-
cance of the connections between the centres of heavy
industry (Upper Silesia) and the seaports (North-South
routes), and from the considerations related to the col-
laboration within the framework of the former CMEA (in-
ternational routes, with priority on transit). The priorities
of that time did not include, though, the satisfaction of
the internal demand, and thus also of the individual de-
mand for transport. Characteristically, the setting referred
to has largely been accepted by the European Union. The
corridor system of CEMT/TINA corresponds in a gen-
eral outline to the Polish program of motorway construc-
tion. The sole significant exception is constituted by the
Via Baltica route, ensuring the linkage of the Baltic states
with the European transport system, without the neces-
sity of crossing the borders of the third countries.
In spite of the fact that the official basis for the
elaboration of the program of motorway construction was
constituted by the studies of the current and forecasted
road traffic, there is in reality an inconsistency between
the planned course of routes and the course of routes fea-
Fig. 1  Present motorway construction governmental project
Source: Narodowa Strategia Rozwoju Transportu na lata 2000-2006 (National Strategy of Transport Development 2000-2006)3
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turing the heaviest traffic in the year 2000 (when the most
recent comprehensive traffic studies have been carried
out). According to various estimates, construction of
motorways becomes profitable when traffic intensity on
a given route segment attains the level of 15-18,000 ve-
hicles per 24 hours. The relatively high intensity of traf-
fic (above 15,000 vehicles per 24 hours) was observed
in the year 2000 on the routes following the course of
the main parallel motorways (except for their eastern seg-
ments), and on fragments of the meridional route. Be-
sides, a similar, and in some places even higher, intensity
appeared on the exit routes from the Warsaw agglomera-
tion, which were not included in the construction program
mentioned (see Figure 2). The forecasts of traffic inten-
sity assume, as well, its highest increase on exactly the
same routes12. Thus, Poland became one of the few coun-
tries of the region, and also of the entire Europe, in which
the planned pattern of the new infrastructure was not
based upon the star-shaped model with the centre in the
country's capital (like in France, United Kingdom, Hun-
gary, and numerous other countries).
Similarly, the internal structure of foreign trade (like
the share of individual provinces in exports) and the spa-
tial distribution of the border traffic demonstrate that in
conditions of the 1990s the highest importance in terms
of transport should be attached to the parallel connections,
followed by the diagonal ones, and only then - to the me-
ridional connections. Since the most developed core of
the European Union exerts nowadays beyond doubt the
strongest economic influence on Poland within the con-
tinental scale, the economic associations and hence also
the infrastructural needs are oriented in its direction. That
is why the central parallel corridor, stretching between
The Netherlands and Moscow, “collects” in its consecu-
tive large transport nodes (Berlin, Poznan´, Warsaw,
Brest’, Minsk) the diagonal connections, inclined towards
the West, stretching out both to the North and to the
South. Therefrom, the modern transport system (includ-
ing exactly the motorway network) of the country should
to a lesser degree refer to the chessboard setting (conform,
by the way, to the McLean's network model of the 1930s,
meant in fact for the colonies), and much more to the hex-
agonal setting13.
The lack of adaptation of the setting of planned
routes to internal demand (and to some extent also to the
international one) was one of the reasons of failure of
the entire program of motorway construction. Initially,
Polish motorways were to be constructed in the BOT
system. The construction consortia (and the subsequent
operators) were offered the opportunity of constructing
little profitable segments of the motorways. Only one
route (A-2, a fragment of the Warsaw-Berlin corridor) is
being currently stage-wise put to use (at the end of the
year 2004 the middle segment of 150km of length was
functioning). The concessionnaire, however, gave up the
realisation of several local nodes, which deprived the
inhabitants of a couple of towns of the possibility of us-
ing the motorway. In case of the second project the state
was forced to change the principles of financing (grant-
ing the direct investor the guarantee of covering the losses
in case the traffic is lower than forecasted). At the same
time, work was started on the elaboration of the legal
bases for the public-private partnership in the realisation
of the remaining segments. The largest investment project
carried out in the past decade (the motorway Wrocaw-
Gliwice) was constructed entirely with the state-disbursed
and European means.
The here described inertia of spatial planning ap
plies also to other transport means. Moreover, it appears
on both the national and local scale. The last segment of
the currently constructed underground line in Warsaw
leads – conforming to the plans of the 1950s - to the metal
works that are losing their economic significance alto-
gether. The inertia directly affects also the problem of
sustainable transport development, of interest for us here.
It is often so that the investment project designs are not
being corrected even in situations, which are evident from
the point of view of nature protection. This was, for in-
stance, the case of the already constructed motorwayFig. 2 National roads with highest traffic (2000)
Source: Ruch Drogowy 2000, (Road Traffic 2000)11
> 15 000 vehicles per day
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Wrocaw-Gliwice, which cuts through the Landscape Park
of Mount St. Anne (according to the German plan from
the 1930s).
The causes for this inertia should be sought in the
financial shortages (in some places in the previous pe-
riod the initial capital costs were already borne, like for
land purchase), and in the fact that making of changes in
the development plans is a risky undertaking for the poli-
ticians. Thus, even carrying out of investment projects,
for which land was secured since 40 years, encounters
social protests (from, e.g., persons, who settled in the
1990s in the direct neighbourhood of the planned project,
and assumed that the motorway would never in fact be
built). In case of implementation of entirely new designs,
the situation is as a rule, even more difficult.
4. INERTIA IN THE FUNCTIONING AND
TRANSPORTATION OF THE PUBLIC
CARRIERS
It is commonly held that the bad condition of the
large-scale public carriers in Poland (and first and fore-
most of the state railways - PKP) and the degradation of
the railway transport is due to the drastic cutting of the
budgetary subsidies. In practice, though, an enormous
impact was due to the decreasing demand for transport
services of both cargo (particularly of mass transport) and
passengers. Moreover, there was an obvious positive
feedback between the decreasing demand and limitation
of subsidies (and the associated increase of transport
rates). It is often noted that among the factors condition-
ing the Polish car ownership boom the change in the re-
lation between the prices of fuel and fares in public
transport was one of the most important ones. Thus, in
1989 the average monthly net wage bought 291 railway
tickets for the distance of 100km or 465 litres of gas,
while in 1998, respectively, only 118 such tickets and 549
litres of gas14.
The policy in the domain of restructuring of rail-
ways (PKP) was aimed during the entire period of trans-
formation at the short-sighted and defensive economic
objectives and was conducted largely under the influence
of the trade unions. The strategic objective was to achieve
positive financial effects and to preserve the enormous
employment numbers, and not to modernise the network
and gain new markets. The actions aimed at the attain-
ment of this objective consisted in liquidation of train
connections, increase of fares and sale of the estate
owned. The success was limited. The excess employment
was not liquidated, and the enterprise found itself in ex-
traordinarily large debts. Actually, the subsidies were pre-
served, and only changed their form to the so-called
un-debting. The primary problem of the railways in Po-
land consists in the fact that the interests of state and so-
ciety are not identical with the interests of the PKP
company15, and nowadays it is not identical with the in-
terests of the companies that emerged after the division
of the PKP. At the same, time these companies benefited
from gigantic subsidies absorbed to a very high degree
by the payroll and only marginally disbursed for invest-
ments. The railways salvage themselves by selling land
and buildings. This, though, is of course a short-term
policy. It is admitted that the adopted form of restructur-
ing does not provide the proper conditions for true com-
petition on the railway transport market7.
Other kinds of errors have been committed during
the restructuring of the coach transport company PKS (the
fact of practical withdrawal of the state car transport from
the cargo transport segment - current share of the mar-
ket being at less than 1% - should be considered natu-
ral). The breakdown into 167 independent regional units,
however, brought about an excessive partitioning of the
company. In the course of this process the specific fea-
tures of the individual branches of the PKS company had
not been accounted for, which resulted in the polarisation
of the situation of the newly emerging enterprises (some
of them having faced bankruptcy16). Besides, rapid
privatisation has not followed this drastic decentralisation.
It must be emphasised, though, that the negative effects
of the restructuring activities in road transport on the scale
of the country are incomparably smaller than in the case
of railway transport. The state-owned businesses can (and
even ought to) be replaced in this case with ease by pri-
vate enterprises, and the downfall of the former does not
directly entail the loss of value of the very transport in-
frastructure (it has mainly an economic character).
5. EXCESS LIBERALISATION OF THE
POSSIBILITY OF PROTESTING AGAINST
INVESTMENT PROJECTS
The issue of the so-called “social protests” against
the transport-related investment projects has not been un-
til recently a subject of scientific study in Poland. This
issue is not a homogeneous one. It is possible, generally,
to distinguish three groups of actors taking part in the pro-
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tests. These are:
– private persons or their groups,
– self-governmental units,
– other bodies, including, first of all, organisations
and associations (including, in particular, the
more or less genuine ecological organisations).
Protests are channelled through both the judicial court
procedures and through the lobbying oriented at the self-
governmental or central authorities, as well as by the in-
termediary of the media. In case of private persons it is
also quite frequent that physical obstruction is carried out
by withstanding the right-of-way estate purchase proce-
dure. Besides, it is reasonable, from the point of view of
planning, to distinguish the protests against:
– investment projects placed for many years already
in the development plans of a given area,
– investment projects currently being introduced (or
meant to be introduced) into the respective plans.
Both the subjects and the objects of the protests
should be considered as important in the evaluation of the
social and legal justification of the protests. Thus, the pro-
tests of the self-governmental units against the new cen-
tral plans (or the plans of the superior level units) as well
as those of the private persons against the new plans of
the self-governmental units of the lowest level (com-
munes) should be considered as most legitimate. Yet, in
Polish conditions a vast proportion of the protest activi-
ties are oriented against the undertakings that have been
planned already decades ago (like, for instance, the route
of the A-2 motorway through Warsaw, for which the land
has been reserved since the 1970s). The subjects of these
protests are often the organisations and associations that
have no formal warrant for representing local commu-
nities. In the extreme cases the activities of such organi-
sations have a corruptive character.
The attitude of self-government with respect to the
transport related investment projects is often indiscrimi-
nate (according to a study from 2002 as much as 62.5%
of the communes see an improvement of accessibility in
the modernisation of the expressways - Judge E. Et al.,
2004), which means that the role of protesters is taken
over by the organisations not having any democratic rep-
resentation.
The escalation of protests is undoubtedly also due
to the negligence of the investors in terms of observation
of legal and technical procedures. It appears also that an
important role is played by the lack of an ultimate arbi-
trator as to the estate price in case of the impossibility of
striking a deal between the owner and the unit carrying
out land purchase for the purpose of an investment
project. The potential appeals from the decisions of such
a body, to be carried out through courts, should not de-
lay taking over the land and realisation of the project (fur-
ther decisions may have a financial aspect, but ought not
concern the very fact of purchase). In this context it
should also be emphasised that the low capacity of the
court system in Poland constitutes an institutional barrier
for the effective development of transport infrastructure.
6. LOW FLEXIBILITY OF POLICY IN THE
DOMAIN OF IMPROVEMENT OF ROAD
TRAFFIC SAFETY
An important increase of road traffic was one of the
reasons for introducing changes in the Road Traffic Law
and in other regulations pertaining to car traffic and to
the parking systems. These changes have been introduced
in Poland with a significant delay. Thereby, mass devel-
opment of private car ownership and car transport took
place in Poland in conditions of validity of numerous
regulations from the period of the 1970s and 1980s, when
the number of cars on the road was several times smaller.
     There were 51,000 road accidents in Poland in 2003,
in which 5,600 persons were killed. Thus, while the num-
ber of accidents is not significantly different from the
numbers noted in the countries of Western Europe, the
number of persons killed remains disproportionately
high17. It is considered that the causes of this state of af-
fairs include:
– lower quality of cars on the road, including the
fact that at the same time very old and brand new
cars are on the road (featuring very different tech-
nical capacities),
– worse quality of the road infrastructure,
– high proportion of relatively new drivers,
– low level of social acceptance for some regula-
tions of the Road Traffic Law.
An institutional constraint is constituted by the
minimally flexible and spatially indiscriminate policy in
the domain of traffic regulations. An example is provided
by the non-differentiated speed limitation in individual
localities crossed by roads of national importance (a com-
monly applied system in Western Europe). Until as late
as 2004 the speed limit within the urbanised areas was
relatively high, namely 60km/h. In Europe the most com-
mon in Europe speed limit of 50km/h was introduced on
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almost all roads, including thruways in large towns. A
clearly negative influence is also exerted by the currently
functioning system of driver training, in which the main
emphasis is placed on parking manoeuvres, and not on
driving in intensive traffic and at high speeds.
Let us indicate, though, that in the 1980s and at the
beginning of the transformation, the development of car
transport brought about a proportional increase in the
number of accidents and associated casualties. Later on,
however, the situation underwent an essential change (see
Figure 3). The numbers of accidents stabilised, while the
number of passenger cars was still quickly increasing.
This was due to a gradual replacement of cars by the
newer ones, and also to more rigorous regulations con-
cerning, in particular, safety equipment and its use (safety
belts, child restraint devicies) and driving under the in-
fluence of alcohol (such an event being treated as a
crime). An integrated programme of improvement of road
safety GAMBIT was introduced in 1996, with the aim
of reducing the number of persons killed in road accidents
down to 4,000 per annum by the year 201018. It can, also,
be expected that further positive effects of the new regu-
lations will appear with a certain delay.
7. CONCLUDING REMARKS
During the entire period of systemic transformation
the role of the barriers outlined here has not been curbed.
It can be postulated that it is partly because of this fact
that the years of rapid economic development of Poland
(1994-2000) have not been adequately used for the ex-
pansion of transport infrastructure (and for improvement
of safety in road traffic). In the opinion of Taylor7,  these
years were wasted in terms of the capacities of Polish
transport. Consequently, in the year 2004 Poland became
a member of the European Union with an infrastructure
not much different from the one we had in 1989. More-
over, a part of this infrastructure underwent significant
wear. This puts Poland in a worse position than the ma-
jority of the remaining new member countries. The
progress in road construction (including motorways) was
over the last 15 years distinctly greater in Hungary,
Slovakia, Bohemia, and even in the Baltic states (espe-
cially if we take into account the surface area and the de-
mographic potential of these countries). At the same time,
it is held that the differences in accessibility between
Western Europe and Central-Eastern Europe will remain
significant even after the re-integration of the Eastern
Source: Own elaboration based on Central Statistical Office data
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European transport networks19. This will occur despite the
official declarations that modernisation of infrastructure
should contribute to closing the gap between Poland and
the old members of the European Union20.
This bears a negative impact on the competitiveness
of the Polish region, especially those situated far from the
few existing segments of the modern road or railway in-
frastructure. The first effects of such a situation were
the vain attempts of winning the locations for investment
projects in the car industry (lost to Czechia and Slovakia).
While until the end of the 1990s the key factor for the
location of foreign investments was the magnitude of the
market and the labour cost, we are observing now a vis-
ible increase of importance of the transport accessibility
element. Conforming to the results of a study conducted
at the University of Wrocaw among foreign investors, as
much as 68% of companies approached mentioned as a
key location factor the access to modern road infrastruc-
ture4.
It is not easy to overcome the barriers outlined here,
since it would require, in the majority of cases, law-mak-
ing activity. It was demonstrated that the sources of the
constraints on development lie to an extent outside of the
transport sector itself. They reach, in particular, the very
foundations of the system of distribution of budgetary
means and the incapacity of the court system. A signifi-
cant degree of political influence on the problem of de-
velopment of infrastructure should also be assessed  very
negatively.
The structural funds of the European Union consti-
tute beyond any doubt an opportunity for the Polish trans-
port infrastructure. This opportunity is not only based on
subsidising future investment projects, but it is, of enor-
mous significance from the point of view of unclogging
the decision-making system, responsibility of the deci-
sion-makers and the potential social pressure. The possi-
bility of not using (or wasting) the funds meant for the
development of infrastructure will have a definitely dif-
ferent political aspect when there would be no way of dis-
bursing these means for some other (“socially appropriate”)
goal.
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